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Glen Gibbons, Jr. 
 
Abstract 
In the next 5 to 10 years, the world will experience the emergence of a true Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) - a compatible and, in many respects, interoperable 
system of systems. The U.S. Global Positioning System, Europe's Galileo, perhaps 
Russia's Glonass system, and regional augmentations including the Wide Area 
Augmentation System (WAAS), the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
(EGNOS), radiobeacon-based systems such as the U.S. Nationwide Differential GPS, and 
compatible commercial differential correction services will comprise this multifaceted 
GNSS. Common signal structures and frequency plans will enable combined user 
equipment that reduces the technical complexity and cost, while vastly expanding 
related applications. Additional satellites and signals, both more powerful and with 
improved designs, will increase the availability of robust signal reception outdoors and 
strengthen the potential of indoor positioning using only GNSS user equipment. But the 
path to the future is not without its risks: political, technical, economic, and cultural. 
After nearly a decade of distrust and bickering, Europe and the United States are 
showing signs of real harmony in the matter of global navigation satellite systems. 
Last June, the two powers signed an agreement that lays the foundation for 
substantive cooperation on GPS and Galileo - not merely in system compatibility 
and interoperability, but also in matters of trade and security. 
In certain respects, one can imagine no more unlike enterprises than the U.S. 
Global Positioning System and Europe's Galileo system. GPS is operated by the 
U.S. military establishment as a public entity; Galileo will be managed by a 
private consortium as a public-private enterprise fully under civil control. GPS 
uses one time standard; Galileo, another. The geodetic coordinate frameworks are 
different. Not all the frequencies match up and signal designs will vary. GPS is 
operated as a national system; Galileo is multinational - encompassing not merely 
the 25 nations joined in the European Union, but also the People's Republic of 
China, Israel, India, and a half dozen or more other nations with whom the EU has 
been talking. GPS delivers signals in space for free; Galileo proposes to deliver 
certifiable, guaranteed fee-based services in addition to a free open-access signal. 
And then, of course, there's the most obvious difference: GPS is a real, existing 
system with 29 satellites in orbit and tens of millions of users around the world. 
Galileo is a work in progress. Galileo is a developmental program with a couple 
of billion euros in its pocket, some leased channels on telecommunication 
satellites to support the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
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(EGNOS), a bunch of components not yet assembled into the first Galileo 
spacecraft (out of 30 planned for a full constellation), and a patchwork of ground 
infrastructure. GPS has been fully operational for 10 years. Galileo's original 
completion date, originally planned for 2008, may actually arrive even later. 
Despite these substantial design differences, the two GNSS systems are basically 
variations on a common technological theme. Over the long run, the political, 
institutional, and commercial realm is where interoperability may meet its greatest 
challenge. Technical experts will continually fine-tune frequency plans and signal 
structures. Equipment manufacturers will come up with ever-better products 
based on those designs. Service providers and end users will apply them in 
unpredictable and imaginative ways. But everywhere, these efforts will be 
facilitated - or constrained - by the business models, the rules adopted on 
intellectual property rights, tax policies, security arrangements, carriage 
requirements and regulatory policy, control and management of the space and 
ground infrastructures, international participation in the GNSS programs, and so 
forth. 
Ironically, GPS and Galileo have inhabited a looking-glass world in which the 
two sides were sometimes as divided by their similarities as they were united by 
their differences. The experience with dueling GNSSes has demonstrated a 
similar principle of contrary dynamics. Never were the two sides so far apart as 
when Europeans first wanted to put themselves into the same GPS control room 
as the Americans and, later, when they wanted to put certain Galileo signals on 
some of the same frequencies as certain GPS signals. 
Back in the mid-1990s, a delegation of officials from Brussels came to 
Washington, D.C., to discuss the idea of European participation in the 
management and operation of GPS. The Europeans said they'd even be willing to 
help pay for the operation and modernization of the American system. 
The first thing the Americans asked was Who are you and whom do you 
represent? The European Union? France? Germany? Italy? Brussels? Our NATO 
allies? The European Commission? The European Space Agency? Who are we 
talking to? And the next thing the Americans said was, we don't need your money 
and we don't want it if it means we have to give up an iota of control over a key 
national infrastructure. And besides, you haven't actually allocated any money for 
GNSS, no serious money, anyway; just some study funds. 
Well, the Europeans went off and set about answering those questions and, in the 
meantime, came up with a GNSS of their own - Galileo. Along the way, they also 
created another practical example of how to go about building a political union. 
Nothing sorts out the rhetoric from the real stuff as having to build a tangible 
system and service. After the Airbus project and implementation of the euro 
currency, Galileo already stands as a notable example of successful common 
effort by the European Union. At least, so far. 
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Anyway, after a few years, the European Commission came back to the United 
States once again and said, okay, let's talk about GNSS now. And, because the EU 
appeared to have its diplomatic act together, the United States set up an 
interagency working group, led by the State Department, to meet with the 
Europeans. Nonetheless, for the next couple of years, the two sides seemed to be 
talking past each other, not to each other: the Europeans wanted to talk about 
specific details of the technical designs of the systems. The United States insisted 
on first discussing more general matters such as trade policy and regulatory issues 
first. This went on until two things happened: first, the EU made a firm 
commitment of funding to build Galileo. And, second, the Europeans went ahead 
and came up with a provisional Galileo signal design on their own. Now, what got 
the United States' attention was a part of the proposed Galileo design that would 
have overlaid the publicly regulated service (PRS), an encrypted security-oriented 
signal, on top of part of the new GPS military signal (M-code) planned for the L1 
band. 
Once again, a seeming common ground - use of the same radio frequency - 
became a point of contention. U.S. defense officials argued strongly that the PRS 
overlay would undermine GPS operators' ability to jam non-military signals in a 
theater of operations without interfering with the M-code. At that point, the two 
sides began talking about all of the issues at once. They set up technical working 
groups - which sometimes met under secret classified conditions -- to come up 
with mutually workable solutions. The United States even went so far as to 
propose that GPS would use a similar signal structure as Galileo - the binary 
offset carrier (BOC) - if the EU would agree to a narrower frequency plan that 
moved the PRS away from the M-code. 
In effect, a change in political reality - the fact that Galileo would be built whether 
or not the U.S. government wanted that to occur - precipitated a change in U.S. 
technology policy. So, in Washington, D.C., the question was no longer how to 
keep GPS as the only fully operational GNSS. The question for the United States 
became how to ensure that the systems were secure, compatible, and 
interoperable. By compatible, I mean that the systems do not interfere with each 
other. Interoperable refers to the synergistic effect of being able to use both 
systems together to accomplish things that could not be achieved by either system 
alone - for instance, greater continuity in tracking vehicles or persons in urban 
areas. 
Now, the technical compatibility and interoperability of these two GNSSes for 
which the initial U.S.-EU agreement has laid the foundation will definitely bring 
GPS and Galileo closer together. On the other hand, the differences between the 
two complementary systems will tend to bring the GNSS world closer together. 
By complementary, I mean the two systems are similar enough to be compatible, 
but different enough to be useful. Separate GPS and Galileo signals, separate 
ground and space infrastructures, separate operating entities, and separate 
budgets. These things will build the global GNSS marketplace and user 
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community faster than one system alone. That will occur as a result of the 
increased redundancy, signal availability, robustness, and ultimately, user 
confidence that result from having compatible but independent systems. 
Not only will they be complementary systems, but they will also be two primary 
systems - that is, each on its own will be capable of providing a complete 
positioning and timing service. This simple and seemingly self-evident concept 
has not fully taken root yet. A few years ago, about the time the European system 
was designated Galileo, I was moderating a GNSS panel at a conference in 
Toulouse, France - a center of the European space industry. An official from 
EADS, one of the leading European defense and aerospace companies, made the 
observation, "It will be desirable to have a back-up GNSS." And I said, "Yes, 
GPS as a back-up to Galileo, right?" And the EADS official looked at me quite 
blankly, because he had meant the opposite. At the time, part of the argument for 
building Galileo was that it would provide a back-up for GPS in case the U.S. 
system experienced a failure. That rationale and the fact that GPS came first and 
had been an operational system for many years has created the sense of its 
primacy - even among public and private advocates for Galileo. That unspoken 
attitude still persists in some quarters, and probably will persist until an 
operational Galileo system has achieved true parity - or even a superior position - 
with GPS. At which point, either system will serve as a back-up - as well as a 
complement - for the other. 
In addition to these benefits, Galileo will help keep the United States honest in its 
management of GPS. Not that I think the U.S. government has been noticeably 
dishonest or narrowly manipulative in this matter. Quite the contrary, the United 
States has been remarkably open-handed in ensuring access to GPS by users 
around the world. In fact, the rapid adoption and spread of GPS technology and 
applications could not possibly have taken place the way it did without that 
policy. And it is a precedent that I believe Galileo's leaders would benefit from 
considering further. 
Over the years, the United States has been criticized for many things regarding its 
GPS policies and management. But one thing that it did get right - perhaps in 
large part accidentally and almost unwittingly - was to make the civil signal open 
and free to users around the world. 
Nonetheless, unilateral control, like unilateral policy-making, of such a potent 
global utility is an invitation to complacence and unresponsiveness by the system 
operator. Monopolies also tend to pose threats to technological innovation and 
economic progress. 
To this end, the mere discussion of a European system has already benefited 
GNSS users, and Galileo's implementation will extend those benefits. I believe 
the prospect of Galileo contributed to the urgency to craft the first comprehensive 
U.S. presidential policy on GPS in 1996, to eliminate selective availability in May 
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2000, and to modernize the Block IIR generation of satellites. I believe that 
approval of Galileo's implementation by the European heads of state and 
authorization of public funding will help keep GPS modernization, including the 
GPS III program, on track. Completion of Galileo within the near term will 
definitely accelerate growth in GNSS product and service markets, as well as 
drive new applications. It could also encourage the United States to change its 
launch policy from launch-on-need, that is, replacing satellites only as they fail. 
This launch-on-need policy means that many critical innovations in GPS signal 
and system design have to wait until after launch of all the unused satellites with 
an earlier technology that has been outstripped by technical advances. Successful 
completion of a Galileo constellation with new signals and higher power could 
encourage GPS' managers to launch on a planned schedule to more quickly install 
a new operational capability with the modernized GPS signals and satellites. 
So, all this comes as good news for GNSS equipment manufacturers and users 
around the world. But many objectives must still be achieved and many obstacles, 
avoided, before compatible, interoperable GNSS becomes a reality. An example 
of the kinds of things that can derail this process can be seen in a recent article in 
a British newspaper. The article described an exchange between U.S. and 
European officials attending a conference on military space relations that led to 
one U.S. delegate suggesting that the United States would attack Galileo satellites 
if they continued transmitting signals that might be used by adversaries in a 
theater of conflict. 
Now, I would not invest this anecdote with too much weight or power - even if it 
is completely true, even if these comments were actually made. I believe that they 
represent more an expression of anxiety than of intention. Indeed, I think that we 
should all share the anxiety of misuse of GNSS, whether GPS or Galileo. But, as I 
understand the NAVWAR (navigation warfare) scenarios, capabilities, and 
solutions developed by the U.S. Defense Department, the primary means to 
prevent hostile use of GNSS will be much more benign, limited in scope and 
targeted against the perpetrators and not GNSS system operators. And between 
any GNSS-related crisis and an assault on Galileo satellites or infrastructure 
stands the agreement signed in June, which established the official channel for 
relations between the European Union and the United States in GNSS matters. 
Let's turn briefly to the new U.S. presidential policy on GPS issued December 8, 
2005. What the policy actually addresses is the broader term of space-based 
positioning, navigation, and time or PNT, but for all practical purposes, it refers to 
GPS and its augmentations. 
Let me mention five specific themes in this new space-based PNT policy that 
have a bearing on the issue of an interoperable GNSS. 
First, the policy elevates the level of coordination of GPS policy and 
management. It replaces the Interagency GPS Executive Board established under 
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President Clinton's GPS policy directive in 1996 with a National Space-Based 
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee. The new group will 
be cochaired by deputy sectaries of defense and transportation. The former body 
had been headed by lower ranking officials. 
Second, the policy reaffirmed the free, open use of current and future civil GPS 
signals as well as the free availability of technical specifications for the system. 
These specifications enable manufacturers to design and build GPS receiver 
equipment. They can be found in the GPS Interface Control Document or ICD. 
Third, the policy directs the new PNT Executive Committee to oversee creation of 
a five-year plan that provides for cost-sharing among federal agencies that 
represent civil user communities. The plan must also address the need for further 
augmentation systems for space-based PNT and for any unique or accelerated 
PNT capabilities. 
Fourth, the new policy spends a great deal of time addressing security-related 
needs and issues. That should not be surprising, because we are living in a very 
different world than the one in which the 1996 policy was created. The PNT 
policy process was overseen by the National Security Council rather than the 
White House Office on Science and Technology Policy, which directed the first 
effort on GPS. The Bush policy identifies GPS - or PNT - as a component in 
critical U.S. infrastructures, such as transportation and telecommunications. 
The new directive issues a long series of mandates to the secretaries of defense 
and homeland security to increase the nation's capability to anticipate, protect 
against, and detect interference, attacks, or hostile exploitation of GPS. It even 
discusses the potential need to deny hostile use of space-based PNT within the 
United States, and calls for provision of back-up systems to take over PNT 
functions in the extremely unlikely case that space-based systems become 
temporarily unavailable. 
Finally, the policy directive - both implicitly and explicitly - has the goal of 
maintaining U.S. primacy in GNSS affairs. It speaks of GPS remaining "the pre-
eminent military space-based PNT service." It calls for ensuring civil PNT 
services "that exceed or are competitive" with foreign systems." And it seeks to 
promote U.S. technological leadership in applications involving space-based 
positioning, navigation, and timing. 
Unfortunately, one of the things that the document does not address very 
substantially is the relationship between GPS and other GNSS systems. Despite 
last June's agreement with the European Union on GPS/Galileo cooperation, it 
does not mention Galileo by name. The directive does mention the goal of seeking 
to ensure that foreign space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems are 
interoperable with the civil services of the Global Positioning System and to 
address mutual security concerns with foreign PNT providers to prevent hostile 
6
Online Journal of Space Communication, Vol. 5, Iss. 9 [], Art. 28
https://ohioopen.library.ohio.edu/spacejournal/vol5/iss9/28
use of space-based positioning, navigation, and timing service. It gives the PNT 
Executive Committee the responsibility for relationships with foreign positioning, 
navigation, and timing services. But nowhere does the policy document provide 
an enabling directive to implement the goal of compatible, interoperable global 
navigation satellite systems. 
So, what are some of the things that need to be done to continue the auspicious 
beginning on GPS and Galileo cooperation? Well, here a few suggestions: 
• Establishing a permanent mechanism for regular political consultations on the 
GNSS agenda, which must inevitably evolve as the systems mature and 
modernize. 
• Cooperation in system operations and open formal lines of communications, 
24/7, between GPS and Galileo controllers - whether that's a black box or a red 
telephone, or even an exchange of liaison officers in master control stations. 
• A further agreement on security-related matters that sketches out the 
appropriate actions for possible threat scenarios. That could even include 
creation of a joint security board for assessing threats against either system, 
evaluating situations that might require jamming or degradation of civil signals, 
and recommending appropriate courses of action. Of course, actual events 
rarely take the exact form or follow the exact course anticipated by contingency 
plans. But forward-looking conventions would increase the state of readiness, 
the familiarity of GNSS operators and officials with their counterparts, and the 
capacity for responding to threat situations in whatever form they may arise. 
• Clear statements on the reciprocal role that industrial partners from the 
United States and Europe can have in building and operating the other's 
GNSS. The Boeing Company has included Alenia Spazio and Alcatel 
Space on its GPS III team, EADS-Astrium is working with Boeing in 
GPS/Galileo matters, and the iNavsat consortium has done the same with 
Lockheed Martin, SiRF Technology, and NavTeq in its efforts to secure 
the Galileo concession. 
But more needs to be done. The Galileo Joint Undertaking, the Galileo 
Supervisory Authority, or, if necessary, the European Council of Transport 
Ministers should provide a clear statement on status, ownership, and 
access to the Galileo equivalent of the GPS Interface Control Document 
(ICD). The GPS ICD provides complete technical specifications that 
enable manufacturers to build GPS equipment. 
The two sides should also clarify the rules for U.S. companies' 
participation in building, maintaining, and operating Galileo. At the same 
time, the United States should clarify its guidelines on the export of 
GNSS-related technologies and the allowable scope for European 
industrial participation in the GPS III program. 
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• Agreements on carriage requirements for airplanes and commercial vessels that 
minimize the financial burdens on the transport companies and maximizes the 
use of combined GPS/Galileo equipment. 
In closing, I'd like to end with a small warning. You often hear people say that the 
uses of GPS are limited only by the human imagination. I've used the expression 
myself. It has a wonderful gee-whiz quality to it: Limited only by the human 
imagination. And with a second, interoperable GNSS, I guess that, what, the 
human imagination will get twice as big, or GNSS innovations will take place 
twice as fast, or something like that? 
But I had an experience a few months ago as led me to think about that idea a 
little more closely: While attending a conference in Sydney, Australia, l visited 
the Royal Botanical Gardens. One of the many amazing facts that I learned there 
is that the world contains 80,000 species of edible plants. However, only 20 
species comprise 90 percent of the food actually eaten by the world's population - 
things like corn, wheat, and rice. So, before we start feeling too smug about the 
prospects of GNSS, and assuming that a second system is going to make things 
twice as good, I think we need to recall our track record with the human diet. 
Only implementing 20 out 80,000 options isn't so hot, and we need to do better 
with GNSS. And that will take not merely imagination, but hard work, good 
intentions, and sustained effort. 
GPS and Galileo represent very different ways of achieving the same ends. It's a 
little like the differences among faith traditions that are so troubling the world 
today. The religious supremacists argue, sometimes violently, that their tradition 
is the only way. But a modern sensibility suggests that faith - while each can be 
primary and unique for its followers - should not be considered exclusive. We 
should let every person find his or her own way to the heavens - whether in 
matters of faith or of GNSS. 
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